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A Constitution for the Oceans: Comments
and Suggestions Regarding Part XI of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text
ELISABETH MANN BORGESE*
In this Article, Mrs. Borgese critically examines the provi-
sions of Part XI of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text
and continues the trend she began last year** by indicating
the relationship between the law of the sea and efforts of the
developing nations to restructure the world political and
economic system. She continues with an acute critique of the
present draft of the negotiating text and makes provocative
suggestions for reforming the draft to accommodate the quest
of developing nations for a new world economic order.
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea concluded its work on July 15, 1977.' A week after its
adjournment, a new document was released-the Informal Compos-
ite Negotiating Text (ICNT).2 It was drafted under the direction of
the Conference President, Ambassador H. Shirley Amerasinghe,
working in close cooperation with the Chairmen of the three working
Committees-Paul Engo of Cameroon, Andres Aguilar of Venezuela
* Associate, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions; Chairperson,
Planning Council of the International Ocean Institute, The Royal University of
Malta (Pacem in Maribus).
** In Borgese, The New International Economic Order and the Law of the
Sea, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 584 (1977), Mrs. Borgese argued that there is a
significant relationship between the new international order and the law of the
sea that must be dealt with in a total problem-solution approach.
1. Wash. Post, Aug. 14,1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
2. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP. 10 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
and Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria-plus the Chairman of the Draft-
ing Committee, Alan Beesley of Canada, and the Rapporteur, Ken-
neth Rattray of Jamaica. The new document will serve as a basis for
discussion at the Seventh Conference Session, scheduled to open on
March 28, 1978, in Geneva. After the conclusion of the next session, it
should be turned over to the Drafting Committee, which will trans-
form it from a "negotiating text" into a Draft Convention to be voted
on during the Eighth Session and, hopefully, adopted by 1979.
The Sixth Session was exceptionally long. The original schedule of
seven weeks was immediately extended to eight weeks, and work was
unusually hard. Some working groups worked literally day and
night. There was the usual frustration and waste accompanying any
undertaking of this magnitude and complexity, but there were
breakthroughs on major points, and the release of the ICNT clearly
marked the beginning of a new and conclusive phase of the Confer-
ence. This is not merely because the ICNT is a new document, but
because it is a document qualitatively different from previous
Conference documents.3 It articulates a small but significant number
of breakthrough proposals, and it recasts, harmonizes, and unifies
the work of the three Committees into the work of one Conference.
The Conference has thus achieved a Draft Ocean Space Convention.
The term Draft Ocean Space Convention is used purposively, for
this was the title of a working paper introduced by the Delegation of
Malta in the United Nations Seabed Committee in 1971, 4 and this
working paper must be acknowledged as the prototype or ancestor of
the ICNT. In form and content there are basic similarities between
the two documents. The Maltese Draft consists of thirty-one chap-
ters in five parts and 205 articles. The ICNT consists of sixteen-parts
and 303 articles with seven annexes. Both documents begin with a
general, noninstitutional part, streamlining and bringing up to date
the traditional law of the sea.5 Both continue with a section on limits
dealing with the traditional titles, such as baselines, straight
baselines, mouths of rivers, bays, and so forth,6 followed by sections
containing general rules for the conduct of States in ocean space,
7
3. Previous Conference documents include the Revised Single Negotiating
Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNT]; and
the Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8 (1975).
4. Draft Ocean Space Treaty-Working Paper Submitted by Malta, in Re-
port of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 105,
U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DOSC].
5. ICNT, supra note 2, pts. I to II, § 1; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. I.
6. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. I, § 2; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. II.
7. ICNT, supra note 2, pts. II, §§ 3-4 to III; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. III.
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sections on ocean space under national jurisdiction,8 and sections on
ocean space under international jurisdiction.9
There are three major differences between the noninstitutional
parts of each document. First, in the Maltese Draft the general provi-
sions' ° are more complete, incorporating much of the material (scien-
tific research, for example) which in the ICNT has been left for a later
section.' The ICNT reflects to some extent the former, not yet
completely dissolved division of the three Parts of the three Commit-
tees. Second, in the Maltese Draft national ocean space is a unified
concept which includes internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zone, economic zone and economic shelf to a distance of 200 miles
from clearly defined baselines.12 This is a far more modern, stream-
lined, and workable concept than the traditional divisions and
categories found in the ICNT.13 Third, in the Maltese Draft, interna-
tional ocean space beyond clearly defined limits of national juris-
diction is likewise a unitary concept, encompassing seabed, water
column and surface, the whole constituting the "common heritage of
mankind."' 14 The ICNT, however-more or less consistently-
conceives only the international seabed as common heritage, while
the superjacent waters are still subject, with some necessary adapta-
tions, to the traditional regime of the "freedoms of the High Seas.' 15
The ICNT's approach causes many difficulties and contradictions.
In both documents, the noninstitutional part is followed by an
institutional part, describing the structure and functions of new
ocean institutions.'6 The main differences are first, that the Maltese
Draft provides an institutional framework for themanagement of all
uses of ocean space and resources and a dispute settlement system.
7
The ICNT provides a complete institutional framework for only one
of these uses-the mining of minerals from the international sea-
bed18-and a dispute settlement system.19 Other uses of ocean space
8. ICNT, supra note 2, pts. IV-VI; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. III.
9. ICNT, supra note 2, pts. VII, IX, XI-XII; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. IV.
10. DOSC, supra note 4, pt. I.
11. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XII.
12. DOSC, supra note 4, pt. II.
13. The ICNT also creates a new division, archipelagic waters. ICNT, supra
note 2, pt. IV (Archipelagic States).
14. DOSC, supra note 4, pt. IV.
15. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI, §§ 1-3.
16. Id., pts. XI, §§ 4-6, XV; DOSC, supra note 4, pt. V.
17. DOSC, supra note 4, pt. V.
18. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI, §§ 4-6.
19. Id., pt. XV.
and resources-management of living resources, navigation, and sci-
entific research-are dealt with, more or less, through the existing
institutional framework. Within this framework, however, the ICNT
foresees and requires structural and functional modifications. Sec-
ond, the institutional part of the Maltese Draft is unified. 20 The
institutional part of the ICNT, however, is disrupted by the insertion
of a second noninstitutional part dealing with environmental policy,
scientific research, and the transfer of technology.21 These were the
provisions of the former Part BI of the Single Negotiating Text
22
which in the Maltese Draft, have been absorbed in the other nonin-
stitutional and institutional parts. Third, the institutional sections on
seabed mining and dispute settlement are far more developed and
advanced in the ICNT than they are in the Maltese Draft.
Thus it is clear that the Maltese Draft-amazingly ahead of its time
in 1971-has remained, in some respects, still ahead of the ICNT. In
other ways it has been surpassed by the political developments, the
changing concepts and interests, and the collective work of the great-
est international conference in history. It is a rather awesome experi-
ence to see this mammoth meeting, despite all difficulties, despite
itself, move ineluctably, as though driven by the dynamism of some
technological or economic or political imperatives transcending the
Conference, in the direction of giving a new order to the oceans and
to the world.
COMAENTS AND SUGGESTIONS
The regime that will govern the management of the resources of the
deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is described in
Part XI of the ICNT, entitled "The Area." Part XI may be divided
into two parts: a noninstitutional part, on principles, conduct of
activities, resource policy, and so forth, comprised of sections 1
through 4; and an institutional part, on the structure and functions of
the Authority, comprised of sections 5 and 6. Perhaps it would be
better, and more in conformity with the organization of the other
parts of the ICNT, if Part XI were formally divided. Thus, it would
become Parts XI and XII of the ICNT.
Part XI begins with Article 133, "Use of terms." This should be
moved to, and consolidated with, Part I of the Convention, which is
also entitled "Use of Terms." The next section, Article 134, concerns
scope or limits. Paragraph 1 of Article 134 provides that "[t]his part
20. DOSC, supra note 4, pt. V.
21. ICNT, supra note 2, pts. XII-XIV.
22. Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doe. AIConf. 62/WP. 8/pt. III
(1975).
[VOL. 15: 371, 1978] A Constitution for the Oceans
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of the present Convention shall apply to the 'Area.'23 This seems
somewhat superfluous because Part XI is in fact entitled "The
Area." Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 134 provide for the modalities
of delimiting the Area. Paragraph 2, however, should be rephrased,
inasmuch as it refers to "limits referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article,"2 4 but paragraph 1 does not mention any limits. The corre-
sponding paragraph of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT)
did note limits, 25 but it has been rephrased in the ICNT; 26 therefore,
paragraph 2 must be rephrased accordingly. Paragraph 4 states that
"[n]othing in [Article 134] shall affect the validity of any agreement
between States with respect to the establishment of limits between
opposite or adjacent States." 27 Paragraph 5 provides that the
"[a]ctivities in the Area shall be governed by the provisions of...
Part XI of the present Convention."28 Again, the language appears to
be somewhat superfluous because the concept is stated throughout
the ICNT in clear and unmistakable terms.
It might be useful, instead, if Article 134 on scope or limits
contained a paragraph about the rights and legitimate interests of
coastal States. Article 142, for instance, might be relocated here.
Article 135, which deals with the legal status of the superjacent
waters and airspace, might also be relocated here. The result would
be a concise and complete Article on scope or limits consisting of five
paragraphs.
The basic principle governing the conduct of States in the interna-
tional seabed area is treatment of the area as the common heritage of
mankind. It cannot be stressed enough that the adoption of this
principle by the General Assembly as a norm of international law
marked the beginning of a revolution in international relations. 29 It
has the potential to transform the relationship between poor and rich
countries. It must and it will become the basis of the new internation-
al economic order, of which the Law of the Sea Convention, whether
23. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 134(1).
24. Id., art. 134(2).
25. RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, art. 2(1).
26. Article 2(1) of the RSNT reads: "This Part of the Convention shall apply to
the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, hereinafter called the 'Area'." Id. Article 134(1) of the ICNT states
only: "This Part of the present Convention shall apply to the 'Area'." ICNT,
supra note 2, art. 134(1).
27. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 134(4).
28. Id., art. 134(5).
29. See G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). For a history of the ramifications of this resolution, see generally B.
BuZAN, SEABED PoLrcs 65-302 (1976).
one likes it or not, is both a forerunner and an essential part. It is
surprising, therefore, that the Conference has done so little about
elaborating the concept of common heritage and giving it a clear
definition in legal and economic terms. For the outsider or new-
comer to international law and the law of the sea, it is difficult to
conceptualize the precise meaning of this new concept, which remains
somewhat rhetorical and ethereal. Yet the components of a definition
are all in the ICNT, and one might use the components to formulate
two basic articles:
First Article
The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.
Second Article
For the purposes of this Convention "common heritage of mankind"
means that:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or
person, natural or juridical, appropriate any part thereof. No such
claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights, nor such appro-
priation shall-be recognized.
2. The Area and its resources shall be managed for the benefit of
mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of
States, whether coastal or landlocked, and taking into particular con-
sideration the interests and needs of the developing countries as spe-
cifically provided for in this Part of the Convention.
3. The Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes
by all States, whether coastal or landlocked, without discrimination
and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part of the pres-
ent Convention.
4. Necessary measures shall be taken in order to ensure effective
protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which
may arise from activities in the Area, in accordance with Part VII of
the present Convention.
These paragraphs exemplify the four legal and economic attributes
of the common-heritage concept as they have developed in discus-
sions and writings since their introduction in 1967.30 More briefly,
they are non-appropriability, management for the benefit of man-
kind as a whole, use for peaceful purposes only, and conservation for
future generations. The first of these two proposed articles is actually
Article 136 of the ICNT.3' Paragraph 1 of the second article is identi-
cal to Article 137(1) of the ICNT,32 while paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
Article 137, differentiating resources and minerals, have been omit-
30. Ambassador Pardo of Malta first introduced the common heritage
concept in the United Nations General Assembly in 1967. B. BUZAN, SEABED
PoLiTics 67 (1976).
31. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 136.
32. Article 137 is entitled "Legal status of the Area and its resources." Id., art.
137.
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ted. They might be transposed, however, to Part I, "Use of Terms," at
the beginning of the Convention.3 3 Paragraph 2 of the proposed
articles corresponds to Article 140 of the ICNT,34 while paragraph 3
is identical to Article 141 of the ICNT.35 Paragraph 4 corresponds to
the chapeau of Article 145.36 The subparagraphs of these ICNT arti-
cles could be moved into a later section. Thus, a rather complete and
lapidary definition of the common heritage of mankind can be
drawn from Articles 136, 137, 140, 141, and 145 of the ICNT.
In the ICNT, these articles are interrupted by other articles
concerning principles such as "General conduct of States in relation
to the Area," 37 "Responsibility to ensure compliance and liability for
damage," 38 and "Rights and legitimate interests of coastal States."39
These might appropriately-follow, rather than interrupt, the articles
and paragraphs which essentially define the common-heritage
concept.
The next section of Part XI, section 3, concerns the "Conduct of
activities in the Area." Throughout the ICNT, there is some confusion
about the term activities in the area. In Part I, "Use of Terms," for
example, "'Activities in the Area' means all activities of exploration
for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;"4 that is, the term
activities is narrowly construed to relate only to the exploration and
exploitation of the Area. In section 3 of Part XI, however, this term is
broadly construed. In Part XI the term activities includes marine
scientific research, the transfer of technology, the protection of the
marine environment, the protection of human life, and the disposal of
archaeological and historical objects.
41
Section 3 of Part XI also contains an article entitled "Accomoda-
tion of activities in the Area and in the marine environment," 42 which
includes paragraphs on "installations." Perhaps these would
33. Id., pt. I.
34. Article 140 is entitled "Benefit of mankind." Id., art. 140.
35. Article 141 is entitled "Use of the Area exclusively for peaceful purposes."
Id., art. 141.
36. Article 145 is entitled "Protection of the marine environment." Id., art.
145.
37. Id., art. 138.
38. Id., art. 139.
39. Id., art. 142.
40. Id., art. 1(1)(3).
41. See id., pt. XI, § 3.
42. Id., art. 147.
be better placed in a separate section. There is also an article entitled
"Participation of developing countries in activities in the Area."
43
Obviously the activities in the Area include, above all, devel-
opment of resources of the Area. This notion, however, is articulated
in section 4 of Part XI, which consists of four articles, three of which
are poorly organized and inappropriately titled. They are, "Policies
relating to activities in the Area," 44 which in reality sets forth the
purposes of the Authority; "Functions of the Authority,"4 5 which is
an inappropriate subtitle in a section on the development of re-
sources of the Area; and "Periodic review, '46 likewise an inappro-
priate subtitle for this section.
The title of Article 150, "Policies ralating to activities in the Area,"
and the title of section 3 of Part XI, "Conduct of activities in the
Area," are confusing because although in section 3 activities are
construed broadly, in Article 150 they refer only to the exploration
and exploitation of resources. Thus the scope and purpose of the
Authority remains ambiguous: Is it to be a Seabed Authority, bearing
broad, political responsibilities for the governance of a substantial
area of ocean space? Is it a Seabed Resource Authority, or a Seabed
Mineral-Resource Authority? Is the competency of the Authority
merely economic? And, is the Authority itself really an "Enterprise"?
As early as 1968 it appeared that the new ocean regime would be
partly political, partly scientific, and partly economic; that is, it
would be partly a government and partly a business, and it would
have to combine economics, science, and politics in a new way.47 The
Conference is still wrestling with this problem, and there appears to
be a dichotomy of perceptions: developing countries appear to per-
ceive the Authority as a comprehensive institution, while industri-
alized States perceive it as a business. This ambiguity complicates
the discussion of the structure of the Council,4 8 the relations
between the Council and the Enterprise, 49 and the privileges and
immunities of the Enterprise."
Perhaps the most satisfactory approach to coping with this funda-
mental difficulty would be to insert a section on Purposes after the
43. Id., art. 148.
44. Id., art. 150.
45. Id., art. 151.
46. Id., art. 152.
47. See E. BORGESE, THE OcEAN REGnM (1968) (Center Occasional Paper,
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions).
48. See generally ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI, § 5(3).
49. See generally id., § 5(5).
50. See generally id., § 5(7). See also id., Annex III.
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Principles section.51 This Purposes section should include the much
labored Article 150, paragraphs 1(a) through 1(g), without sub-sub-
paragraphs A through D,52 and paragraph 2, 3 with the addition of fur-
ther subparagraphs after subparagraph (a). The additional subpara-
graphs should include: (a,) the advancement of marine scientific
research and international cooperation to this end; (a2) the protection
of the marine environment and of the living resources of the Area; (a3)
the preservation and equitable disposal of archeological and historical
objects; and (a4) the protection of human life and fair, safe conditions
for work in the Area.
The proposed section on Purposes then should be followed by the
section on the Conduct of Activities.54 This section should begin with
an article on the exploration and exploitation of the mineral re-
sources of the Area to be carried out by the Authority on behalf of all
mankind in accordance with this Convention.55 This could be for-
mulated as a slightly modified version of Article 151(1). 51 Then, the
Activities section should be followed by a section on Resource Policy,
consisting of sub-subparagraphs A through D of paragraph 1 of
Article 150.11 A section on Mode of Exploitation or-even better
perhaps-Management, should follow Resources Policy. The final
section should be Review, consisting of two articles: "Periodic re-
view,"58 and "The Review Conference.
'59
51. The Principles section of the ICNT is Part XI, § 2.
52. Sub-subparagraphs A-D contain detailed provisions for the protection of
developing States from economic consequences of the Area's exploitation.
ICNT, supra note 2, art. 150(1)(g)(A)-(D).
53. Paragraph 2 of Article 150 states:
(a) The Authority shall avoid discrimination in the exercise of its
powers and functions, including the granting of opportunities for ac-
tivities in the Area.
(b) Special consideration for developing countries, including par-
ticular consideration for the land-locked and geographically disadvan-
taged among them, specifically provided for in this Part of the present
Convention, shall not be deemed to be discrimination.
(c) All rights granted shall be fully safeguarded in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention.
Id., art. 150(2).
54. Id., pt. XI, § 3.
55. Section 3 now begins with an article on marine scientific research. Id., art.
143.
56. Article 151(1) provides: "Activities in the Area shall be carried out by the
Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole in accordance with [inter alia] the
provisions of this article ... ." Id., art. 151(1).
57. See note 52 supra.
58. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 152.
59. Id., art. 153.
The structure of the noninstitutional part then would be
straightforward, streamlined, logical, coherent, and complete. It
would consist of seven sections: 1. Limits, 2. Principles, 3. Purposes,
4. Activities, 5. Resource policy, 6. Management, and 7. Review.
Comments Concerning Individual Articles
Articles 150-153 of section 4 of Part XI are part of the so-called
Evensen compromise; that is, they are part of the package laborious-
ly elaborated first in Geneva in March, 1977, by a group meeting
under the chairmanship of Minister Evensen of Norway, and then by
the Chairman's Negotiating Group, again working under Evensen's
direction during most of the Sixth Session. This group produced
three sets of articles: the first concerns the system of production;60
the second deals with the structure of the Authority;6' and the third
involves dispute settlement.62 We are concerned here with the first of
these groups of articles.
Article 150: Policies Relating to Activities in the Area
The first package has been adopted by the ICNT in its entirety. In
addition to Articles 150-153, it is comprised of Articles 144, 169(4),
173(3), Annex II, paragraph 6, and Annex I, paragraph 10.63 Anyone
who will take the trouble to compare the Evensen Text (ET) (upon
which there was little agreement) with the ICNT must come to the
conclusion that the differences are relatively minor. Several changes,
for instance, are merely drafting alterations. Thus, in the ET the end
of the chapeau of paragraph I of Article 150 read "with a view to,"
6s4
while in the ICNT it reads, "specifically so as to insure.
' 65
60. Suggested compromise formula on articles 9, 11, 22, 23, 41, 49, 64, 65,
annex I, paragraph 8, annex H (June 11, 1977), reprinted in 2 FORSCHUNGSIN-
STITUT FOR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT, STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT
UND POLITIKE, DOKUMENTE DER DRITTEN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN-NEW YORKER SESSION 1977, at 420 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ET, pt.
I].
61. Chairman's Negotiating Group: Suggested compromise formulation on
Organs of the Authority (June 29,1977), reprinted in 2 FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FOR
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT, STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK,
DOKUMENTE DER DRITTEN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN-NEw
YORKER SESSION 1977, at 452 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ET, pt. II].
62. Norway: Settlement of Disputes (July 9, 1977), reprinted in 2 FORSCHUNG-
SINSTITUT FUR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT, STIFTUNG WIS-
SENSCHAFT UND POLITIK, DOKUMENTE DER DRITTEN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER
VEREINTEN NATIONEN-NEw YORKER SESSION 1977, at 473 (1977).
63. Articles 150-153 comprise Part XI, § 4 of the ICNT, which is entitled
"Development of resources of the Area." Article 144 deals with technology
transfer to the Enterprise and to developing States. Articles 169(4) and 173(3),
and Annex III, paragraph 10, provide for funding of the Enterprise. Article
169(4) also provides for technology for the Enterprise. Annex II, paragraph 6,
states in general that activities in the Area conducted under Article 151 are to be
governed by Part XI.
64. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 9.
65. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 150.
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For another example, subparagraph (a) of the ICNT version of
Article 150, paragraph 1, adds the words "and rational management"
after "orderly and safe development" of the resources of the Area as
one of the purposes of the Authority. Although "rational manage-
ment" has become an expression favored more by the developing
States than by the industrialized States, who can really reject it as an
aim? What is the difference between "orderly and safe development"
and "rational management"? Furthermore, the ET called for the
avoidance of "unnecessary waste"66 while the ICNT eliminates the
word "unnecessary" and recommends the "avoidance of waste."
6 7
The small, purely verbal, and in no way substantive concession to
the developing countries in subparagraph (a) is immediately compen-
sated for by an equally verbal and nonsubstantial, but more compre-
hensive concession to the industrialized States. The ET contained a
paragraph on the equitable sharing and other economic benefits
68
which was condensed from five lines to one and a half in subpara-
graph (b).69 Some of the ET's language, however, reappears later in
Article 151(9) of the ICNT.
70
Subparagraph (c) on the transfer of technology has been merely
condensed. Subparagraphs (d) and (e) have also been condensed, but
all the elements of Article 9 of the ET are included in Article 150(1) of
the ICNT.71
Paragraph 2 of the ET has been renumbered as subparagraph (g)
and, consequently, subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) from the ET
have become sub-subparagraphs A and B(i) and (iii) in the ICNT. In
66. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 9(a).
67. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 150(1)(a).
68. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 9(b).
69. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 150(1)(b).
70. Article 151(9) reads:
The Authority shall establish a system for the equitable sharing of
benefits derived from the Area, taking into special consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries and peoples, particular-
ly the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged among them, and
countries which have not attained full independence or other self-gov-
erning status.
Id., art. 151(9).
71. These elements include increasing availability of raw materials; securing
adequate supplies to consumers of such minerals originating in the Area as are
also produced outside the Area; maintaining just, reasonable, and remunerative
prices for minerals originating in the Area which are also produced elsewhere;
and promoting equilibrium between supply and demand. Id., art. 150(1).
the ET's subparagraph (a), the words "[flacilitating, through existing
forums. . . measures necessary" 72 have become "acting through ex-
isting forums . . . shall take measures necessary to"73 in the ICNT
sub-subparagraph A. Moreover, the language "as referred to above,"
has been omitted from the ET and replaced by "in accordance with
the rules of procedure established for such organs" at the end of sub-
subparagraph A of the ICNT.74
In sub-subparagraph B(i) of the ICNT, "shall limit" has replaced
"limiting," and "60 per cent" has replaced "two thirds of the cumula-
tive growth segment of the nickel demand." This small percentage
variation was the result of negotiation during the Session. Finally,
one sentence has been added to the sub-subparagraph: "The Author-
ity shall resume the power to limit the production of minerals from
nodules in the Area if the said arrangements or agreements should
lapse or become ineffective for any reason whatsoever. ' 75 Sub-sub-
paragraph B (ii) of the ICNT, which was subparagraph (c) in the ET,
has remained unchanged.
In sub-subparagraph B(iii) of the ICNT, "the annual constant per-
centage rate" from the ET has become the "annual constant percent-
age rate of increase," and the "20-year period prior to the entry into
force of this Part of the Convention" has become "the 20-year period
to 1 January 1980.''71 In addition, there are several changes in techni-
cal language and methodology. These obviously have been suggested
by experts in the technology and economy of marine mineral mining.
It is not likely that they came from developing countries.
The ICNT adds a sub-subparagraph C, providing that "the Author-
ity may regulate production of minerals from the Area, other than
minerals from nodules, under such conditions and applying such
methods as may be appropriate. 77 This notion, however, seems to be
implicit in the concept that the Area and its resources are the
common heritage of mankind. It should not be of great concern to the
nodule mining consortia, but it may be disquieting for the oil
companies because it is increasingly likely that there are hydrocar-
bons in the Area and, certainly, in the Antarctic continental shelf,
which may yet be included in the Area. Whether and when these
resources become economically exploitable is another question.
72. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 9(2)(a).
73. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 150(1)(g)(A).
74. Id.
75. Id., art. 150(1)(g)(B)(i).
76. Id., art. 150(1)(g)(B)(iii).
77. Id., art. 150(1)(g)(C).
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Article 151: Functions of the Authority
The changes in Article 15178 are even less significant than the
changes in Article 150. The ET's language, "[a]ctivities in the Area
shall be conducted, organized and controlled by the Authority, '7 9 has
been changed to "shall be carried out, ' 80 and the ICNT adds that they
shall be carried out "on behalf of mankind as a whole," 81 a rhethori-
cal and unobjectionable addition.
One apparently significant change has been the addition of
paragraph 2(ii), which provides for the exploitation of the Area by
States and companies "which, through contractual or other arrange-
ments, undertake, in accordance with this Part of the present
Convention, to contribute the technological capability, financial and
other resources necessary to enable the Authority to fulfil its func-
tions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article." 82 The real impact of
this addition, however, is more rhetorical than substantial, because
the negotiations between the Authority and applicants for contracts
are delineated in the ICNT as they were in the ET and deal precisely
with the points mentioned here.83 Without making any other changes,
the ICNT adds paragraphs 7 and 8, which deal with the conduct of
activities in the Area, 4 and paragraph 9 from the ET, on benefit
sharing.
85
Paragraph 7 of Article 151 provides:
The Authority shall carry out marine scientific research concerning
the Area and its resources, and may enter into contracts for that
purpose. The Authority shall promote and encourage the conduct of
marine scientific research in the Area, harmonize and co-ordinate
such research, and arrange for the effective dissemination of the
results thereof.86
About this paragraph, a writer in Science Magazine recently
commented:
[P]reviously in the negotiations it had been agreed that research on the.
deep seabed would be allowed to proceed independent of, and without
78. Article 22 of the ET corresponds to Article 151 of the ICNT.
79. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 22(1).
80. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 151(1).
81. Id.
82. Id., art. 151(2)(ii).
83. Id., art. 151(3)-(6).
84. Article 151(7) is similar to Article 143, which deals with marine scientific
research. Article 151(8), concerning technology transfer, is similar to Article 144.
85. Article 151(9) corresponds to Article 9(b) of the ET.
86. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 151(7).
regard to, whatever "Authority" and rules were created for deep
ocean mining. But the Engo text broke this agreement and included
the heading "Marine Scientific Research" under the chapter on
"Conduct of Activities in the Area." It stated, in Article 151.7, "The
Authority shall carry out marine scientific research concerning the
area and its resources ..... Furthermore, this apparently capricious
change seems to have the backing of no less a figure than the confer-
ence's originator and chairman, Hamilton S. Amerasinghe of Sri
Lanka.
87
Comparing the two texts, one cannot help being surprised by this
comment in Science because the ICNT has introduced no substantial
changes. Article 10 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),
corresponding to Article 143 of the ICNT, dealt with scientific re-
search in the Area by States, other entities, and the Authority. 8
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 provides that "[t]he Authority may itself
conduct scientific research in the Area and may enter into agree-
ments for that purpose." 9 The ICNT separates, more neatly, the
activities of States and other entities in the Area from the functions
of the Authority. Because Article 151, paragraph 7, deals with the
functions of the Authority, the provision thus was simply moved
unchanged from Article 143 (formerly Article 10 of the RSNT) to
Article 151 of the ICNT. No substantial change. was made.
Engo did not break any agreement, nor did he "[include] the head-
ing 'Marine Scientific Research' under the chapter on 'Conduct of
Activities in the Area.' "90 Rather, he added a section title, "Conduct
of Activities in the Area," 91 to a sequence of articles which was
already a part of the RSNT.92 There were no section titles in the RSNT,
but there are section titles throughout the ICNT, so one had to be
added. It cannot be denied, nevertheless, that the ICNT Article 151
"Functions of the Authority" is rather confusing; and, as mentioned
above, a "compositing" of the articles on conduct of activites in the
area and Article 151 on functions of the Authority seems necessary
and helpful.
Annex 11: Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation
Annex II, paragraph 6, "Activities conducted by the Enterprise,"
remains unchanged from the ET,93 except for the omission of an
87. Shapley, Ocean Scientists May Wash Hands of Sea Law Treaty, 197
ScrENcE 645, 645 (1977).
88. RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, art. 10.
89. Id., art. 10(2).
90. Shapley, Ocean Scientists May Wash Hands of Sea Law Treaty, 197
SCIENCE 645, 645 (1977).
91. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI, § 3.
92. Section 3 of the ICNT is composed of Articles 143-149. The corresponding
Articles in the RSNT are Articles 10-13, 16, and 18-19. RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I.
93. Annex II, paragraph 6, of the ICNT corresponds to Annex I, paragraph 8,
(new) of the ET.
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incomplete text reference in the ET. The changes in the very compre-
hensive paragraph 5, "Selection of applicants," formerly Annex I,
paragraph 8 (bis) of the ET, are minimal. The phrase "where the
parties so agree" has been omitted in subparagraph (i) of the ICNT.
This is merely a drafting change, and not a substantial one, because
the paragraph provides that "[c]ontracts . . . may provide" not
"[c]ontracts .... must provide." 94 The word "may" clearly implies
the agreement of the parties.
In the ET subparagraph (j)(i), describing the "banking system,"
provided that the Authority should make its selection "as soon as the
Authority has been able to examine the relevant data from prospect-
ing, evaluation, or exploration, as may be necessary to decide that
both parts are equal in estimated commercial value."9 5 The ICNT
subparagraph (j)(i) omits the words "from prospecting, evaluation, or
exploration," inasmuch as there had been no agreement on the ques-
tion of exploration and at whose expense it was to be carried out.
Thus, the omission is a concession to the industrialized States which
insisted that it would be too costly for States or consortia to bear the
costs of exploration for the Area to be reserved for the Authority.
In the ET, what is now subparagraph (j)(iii) of the ICNT referred to
"joint arrangements" and provided for participation by devel-
oping countries. The ICNT adds one sentence: "The nature and ex-
tent of such participation shall be determined by the Authority.
'96
The ICNT adds two subparagraphs, however, (j)(iv) and (j)(v). Sub-
paragraph (j)(iv) provides that the Authority may require the
Contractor to make available to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable
terms the same technology to be used in the contractor's operation. If
there is no agreement on the matter, it is to be referred to arbitra-
tion. 7 Can one really object to such a provision? Does it basically
change the text?
Subparagraph (j)(v) provides that "[n]othing in this subparagraph
shall be interpreted as preventing the Enterprise from carrying out
activities in accordance with the present annex in any part of the
Area not subject to contract or joint arrangement." 98 Because the
94. ICNT, supra note 2, Annex II, para. (i) (emphasis added).
95. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, Annex I, para. 8(j)(i).
96. ICNT, supra note 2, Annex I, para. 5(j)(iii).
97. Id., para. 5(j)(iv).
98. Id., para. 5(j)(v).
Area is the common heritage of mankind, this right seems to be
unobjectionable.
Article 169(4): Financing the Enterprise
In the ET, the paragraph that eventually became Article 169(4) of
the ICNT read: "The Enterprise shall in accordance with article 49,
paragraph 3, and Annex II, paragraph 6(a), be provided with such
funds as it may require to carry out its functions."9 9 The ICNT adds
"and shall receive technology as provided in Article 144, and other
relevant provisions of the present Convention.' 100 There are no other
changes in the article.
Annex III: Statute of the Enterprise
There are no substantial changes in Annex MI, paragraph 10, concern-
ing the financing of the Enterprise. There are two additions, how-
ever, sub-subparagraphs 10(a)(v) and 10(a)(vi), which resulted from
discussion by the negotiating group and are not controversial. The
list of assets of the Enterprise is completed in the ICNT by these two
sub-subparagraphs: "(v) Net income of the Enterprise after transfer
of revenues to the Authority in accordance with paragraph 7. (vi)
Other funds made available to the Enterprise including charges to
enable it to carry out its functions and to commence operations as
soon as possible."''
The segment of the ET that became subparagraph 10(c)(ii) of the
ICNT provided that "States Parties shall make every effort to sup-
port applications by the Enterprise for loans in capital markets,
including loans from international financial institutions.' ' 0 2 The
ICNT adds "and to cause appropriate changes where necessary in the
constitutive instruments of such institutions. 10 3 This addition is the
result of discussion in the Negotiating Group, and there was no
objection to it during the discussion.
Paragraph 10(d) of the Annex, providing that "[t]he funds and as-
sets of the Enterprise shall be kept separate and apart from those of
the Authority,' ' 0 4 has been adopted nearly verbatim from the
RSNT10 5 at the insistance of the industrialized countries.
99. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 41(4).
100. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 169(4).
101. Id., Annex III, para. 10(a)(v)-(vi).
102. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, Annex II, art. 6(c)(ii).
103. ICNT, supra note 2, Annex IMI, para. 10(c)(ii).
104. Id., para. 10(d).
105, RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, Annex II, para. 6(d).
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Article 144: Transfer of technology
Similarly, the changes in the portion of the ET that is now Article
144, concerning the transfer of technology, are minimal.10 6 In para-
graph 1, the ET reads: "The Authority and States parties shall co-
operate in promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowl-
edge relating to activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all
States benefit therefrom. In particular they shall promote ....
The ICNT reads "shall initiate and promote."1 0 8 Subparagraph (a)
delineates what they shall promote. The ET reads "[p]rogrammes for
the promotion of transfer of technology," '10 9 but because "[to] pro-
mote: programmes for the promotion of" is stylistically awkward, the
ICNT omits the words "promotion of." In addition, the ET reads
"facilitating the access of the Enterprise and of developing countries
to the relevant technology, under just and reasonable conditions," 110
while the ICNT reads "under fair and reasonable terms and condi-
tions.""' There are no other changes.
Articles 152 and 153: Periodic Review and the Review Confer-
ence
There are no changes in either Article 152, "Periodic review," or
Article 153, "The Review Conference," with one important excep-
tion. The ICNT adds a paragraph 6 to Article 153, which reads:
If the Conference fails to amend or to reach agreement within five
years on the provisions of this Part of the present Convention govern-
ing the system of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
Area, activities in the Area shall be carried out by the Authority
through the Enterprise and through joint ventures negotiated with the
State and entities referred to in paragraph 2(11) of Article 151, on terms
and conditions to be agreed upon between the parties thereto, pro-
vided however that the Authority shall exercise effective control over
such activities.
112
This point is treated again below in greater detail.11
106. The ET provision corresponding to Article 144 of the ICNT is Article 11.
107. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 11(1).
108. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 144.
109. ET, pt. I, supra note 60, art. 11(1)(a).
110. Id.
111. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 144(a) (emphasis added).
112. Id., art. 153(6).
113. See text accompanying notes 120-23 infra.
Summary
This comparison of the ET and the ICNT has been painstaking,
even pedantic. The purpose has been to refute certain recent
comments from industrialized countries that the ET was a "break-
through," providing an acceptable basis for discussion, but which,
unfortunately, had been irresponsibly brushed aside in the ICNT and
replaced by the totally unacceptable propositions of the Chairman of
the First Committee." 4 The foregoing discussion clearly demon-
strates, however, that all the major elements of the ET" 5 have actual-
ly remained intact in the ICNT. The ET has been fully incorporated
into the ICNT and the changes are minimal." 6 Most of the changes
are merely stylistic, and, considering that the ET was not a
negotiated or approved text but rather an informal basis for discus-
sion-a fragmentary piece that required integration with other parts
of the RSNT-the changes are legitimate. The fact is that with the
exception of Article 153(6), which is discussed below," 7 the ICNT
adds nothing that is not already provided for in some article of the
RSNT or the ET.
The conclusion is that the "Evensen compromise" is itself unac-
ceptable, and the Chairman of the First Committee has been a
scapegoat.
The Inevitable Failure of the Evensen Compromise
The "parallel system" was first proposed by the United States,
which buttressed its proposal with the offer of a substantial financial
contribution to the Enterprise.1 8 This might simply have been a way
of buying free access to the Area for private companies and industri-
alized States. Having consumed the gift, the Enterprise would pose
no further threat. This system was unacceptable to the majority of
States as incompatible with the principle of the common heritage of
mankind. Alternatively, the "parallel system" was to be a true par-
114. See Shapley, Ocean Scientists May Wash Hands of Sea Law Treaty, 197
SCIENCE 645 (1977).
115. Major elements include the resource policy including production limita-
tions; the "parallel system" providing for the exploration and exploitation of the
Area by (a) the Enterprise and (b) States and companies on the basis of contracts
with the Authority; the "banking system," under which areas sought by a
contractor must be divided between the contractor and the Authority; the qual-
ification of applicants; the financial arrangements; and the revision clause.
116. Marne A. Dubs, Director of the Ocean Resources Department of Ken-
necott Copper Corporation, interprets the ET as "nearly as unacceptable to the
developed nations as the Engo text, and ... view[s] Engo's revisions as 'essen-
tially minor changes.' "Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1, & at 11, col. 2.
117. See text accompanying notes 120-23 infra.
118. Wash Post, Aug. 14, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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allel system in which the Enterprise was to assume a position to
operate on equal footing with established industry (in fact the only
possible basis for negotiation). But the difficulties inherent in this
approach were simply insurmountable, and they have remained so.
Minister Evensen has loyally, fairly, and with admirable energy and
resourcefulness attended to his mandate to shape the details of the
"compromise." But it was an impossible mandate from the outset.
The reasons for the necessary, inevitable failure of the Evensen
Compromise have been set forth in some detail elsewhere1 9 and will
be merely summarized here:
1. The production control provisions, apparently overly
complicated, are really meaningless. What is worse, they may gener-
ate consequences opposite those intended because they are based on
the erroneous assumption that the Authority has a monopoly on the
nodules and that it can actually control nodule mining. The fact is
that according to the articles on the limits of national jurisdiction, at
least twenty-five percent of the nodules will fall under national
jurisdiction. In this situation, either the complex and almost unintel-
ligible provisions are such that they do not effectively limit produc-
tion beyond the technological and financial capacity of States and
companies, or, if the limit really falls below that capacity, production
will simply move from the international Area to areas under national
jurisdiction. Thus the Authority will not limit production but merely
limit itself out of business. The much labored sub-subparagraph B of
Article 150(1)(g), therefore, should -be omitted altogether from the
ICNT, not in order to cater to the advocates of a free market econo-
my, but rather, in simple recognition of reality.
2. The parallel system completely changes the status and the
function of the Enterprise. The Enterprise had been conceived as an
instrument through which the Authority would earn a considerable
income which would enable it to function independently of the con-
tributions by States upon which traditional international institu-
tions depend. It would enable the Authority to re-invest in ocean
development and to redistribute wealth in favor of the poorer na-
tions. Now the Enterprise is a bottomless financial drain on the
119. PROCEEDINGS, PACEM IN MAimus VII (spec. ed. Univ. of Malta Press
1977); A. PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA (2d ed. 1976) (Occa!§ional Paper No. 5, International Ocean Institute); id.
(1976) (Occasional Paper No. 4, International Ocean Institute).
Authority. Instead of benefitting all States, rich or poor, through the
common utilization of the common heritage, the Enterprise now
divides rich and poor nations. The rich States and companies do their
own mining while the Enterprise becomes the status symbol of the
poor. As it remains a status symbol, however, there is no economic
incentive to get the Enterprise off the ground. The poor States simply
do not need the Enterprise because nodule production from the deep
seabed contributes nothing to their internal development. Moreover,
those of the poorer nations which are land producers of the nodule
minerals must give priority to the land-based development of their
own minerals, while those which are importers of these minerals
import on such a small scale that investment in the sophisticated,
costly, and risky seabed mining industry at this point would be
totally disproportionate. Thus, the Enterprise would depend totally
on "foreign aid," which should have been transcended by the princi-
ple of sharing in the common heritage. If the principle of the common
heritage is to be applied, the international area must be indivisible.
To paraphrase one Delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference, there
must be a marriage of the common heritage and capital and technolo-
gy. Otherwise, the common heritage remains an illusory dream.
3. The "banking system" is potentially meaningful and benefi-
cial to the Authority against a backdrop of resource scarcity and
total control by the Authority, on the one hand, and of abundant
capital, technology and managerial skill on the other. Instead, with
an abundance of resources and a scarcity of capital, technology and
skill, in combination with the availability of nodules outside the
Area, it is rendered meaningless. And this situation is bound to
prevail in seabed mining for the next twenty-five years. In the pres-
ent situation, States and companies give the Authority what they do
not need and what, incidentally, the Authority already has in abund-
ance: nodules. What the Authority needs, and what States and
companies do not give under the "banking system," is capital, tech-
nology and managerial skill.
4. The problem of "financing the Enterprise" in this situation
becomes totally unmanageable. The Conference, in fact, finds itself
locked in the horns of a dilemma with no way out. Either the Enter-
prise is truly financed and enabled to compete with established
industry (and despite the fact that the financial burden on the indus-
trialized States is such that they cannot accept it, only this solution is
acceptable to most States), or the burden is lightened to the point
where the industrialized States can accept it, in which case the
Enterprise cannot get off the ground. There is no way out of this
dilemma. The problem is structured incorrectly. If one side goes up,
the other goes down, and that is all there is to it.
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These four basic, insurmountable difficulties are built into the
Evensen compromise formula. In no way are they generated by the
minor, mostly verbal modifications introduced by Chairman Engo.
The Nigerian/Austrian Alternative
As though admitting that there was no way to resolve the dilemma,
Chairman Engo seems to have clung despairingly to one article, the
article on the Review Conference. 120 If it were permissible to read
between the lines of the new paragraph 6 of Article 153, the text
would read: "We have failed in our attempt to establish a fair and
workable system of resource exploitation for the foreseeable future.
But let us not abandon our object entirely; let us, instead, prepare a
framework which will ensure that such a system will be created
twenty-five years from now. And in five concise lines he legislatively
seeded the Nigerian/Austrian alternative on a unitary joint venture
system121 to bear fruit twenty-five years from now. A rather daring
move, a counsel of despair!
That the unacceptable paragraph 6 is unlikely to make the unac-
ceptable system of exploitation proposed by the ICNT acceptable,
however, is already evident from the reactions of government spokes-
men and the press in many countries. But paragraph 6 may have one
basic merit. It may, at long last, force the Conference to discuss the
Nigerian/Austrian alternative, which has been hovering over the
horizon for years.
The Austrian proposal abandons the idea of the Enterprise. As an
alternative it provides for a flexible Enterprise system 122 which
guarantees access to States and companies. These, however, may
operate in the Area only through association with the Authority. In
120. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 153.
121. The Nigerian/Austrian alternative on a unitary joint-venture system
began to take shape when it was formally introduced by Nigeria at the end of the
Fifth Session of the Conference. Statement by the Hon. Dan Ibekwe (Sept. 17,
1976). Austria elaborated the Nigerian proposal during the March, 1977, working
session of the Evensen Group in Geneva. Paper Submitted by Ambassador
Wolf, in Report of informal consultations in Geneva 50 app. (Apr. 28, 1977),
reprinted in 1 FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FfmR INTERNATIONALE POLITIn UND
SICHERHEIT, STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND PoLiTiK, DOKUMENTE DER DRITTEN
SEERECHTSKONFERENZ DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN-NEw YORKER SESSION 1977, at
310, 351 (1977).
122. E. BORGESE, THE ENTERPRISES (1977) (Occasional Paper No. 6, Interna-
tional Ocean Institute).
cooperation with the Authority, they must form new Enterprises for
which the Authority provides half of the investment capital and ap-
points half of the members of the Board of Directors (mostly from
developing countries), the other half to be appointed by States and
companies in proportion to their respective investments. Profits
would be shared in proportion to investment.
Initially there would probably be as many Enterprises as there are
mining projects. The Enterprises would form a unitary System based
on cooperation, not competition, between the Authority and estab-
lished industry. The system would radically improve the problem of
financing and technology transfer, and it would immensely simplify
the problem of the technical annexes to the Convention. In fact, much
of this material could be scrapped. Finally, the system would fairly
divide risks and income, and it would maximize participation by
developing countries in all Enterprises. An additional advantage
would be that the system may be easily adapted to operate in areas
under national jurisdiction.
Commenting on paragraph 6 of Article 153, President Amerasinghe
wrote in his Explanatory Note: "As there have been many and varied
references to joint arrangements, and in this case to joint ventures, a
thorough discussion of such methods of exploitation and their impli-
cations would serve a most useful purpose."'
1 23
The time has come.
The Structure and Function of the Seabed Authority
Section 5, "The Authority," and section 6, "Settlement of Dis-
putes," of Part XI of the ICNT describe the structure and functions of
the Seabed Authority. Perhaps they should be divorced from Part XI
to form a separate part concerning the Seabed Authority.
There are no substantial changes in Articles 154 to 156 from the ET
to the ICNT. Paragraph 4 of Article 156, however, has been redrafted
and clarified. 124 The underlying dispute arose when some industri-
alized States expressed concern about possible encroachments by the
Assembly on the activities of the Council and its organs, whereas
other States emphasized the interdependence of all organs of the
123. Informal Composite Negotiating Text Explanatory Memorandum by the
President, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1, at 6 (1977).
124. Article 156(4) reads:
The principal organs shall each be responsible for exercising those
powers and functions which have been conferred on them. In exercising
such powers and functions each organ shall act in a manner compatible
with the distribution of powers and functions among the various organsof the Authority, as provided for in this Part of the present Conventlon.
ICNT, supra note 2, art. 156(4) (emphasis original).
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Authority, with the Assembly being the supreme body. The new text
clearly establishes a "separation of powers."
Articles 157 to 164 of Part XI of the ICNT constitute the second
"Evensen package."' 12 5 If the changes made by the Chairman of the
First Committee in the first Evensen package concerning the mode of
exploitation were very minor (with one exception), those made in the
second package are next to none.
Paragraph 7 of Article 157, for instance, provides that "[d]ecisions
on questions of procedure, including the decision to convene a special
session of the Assembly, shall be made by a majority of the represen-
tatives present and voting."'126 The words "including the decision to
convene a special session of the Assembly" have been added to the
ICNT. They are not in the ET, although they were in the RSNT. 12 7 In
paragraph 10, "one fourth of the members of the Authority"'1 8 from
the ET has become "one quarter of the members of the Authority
' 1 29
in the ICNT.
In another minor change, references to the Seabed Tribunal, wher-
ever occurring, have been replaced by references to the Seabed Dis-
putes Chamber, and the mode of dispute settlement has been har-
monized with Part XI, section 6, "Settlement of Disputes."
A small, purely stylistic change was made in paragraph 1 of Article
158, where the words "shall be entrusted" had occurred twice.
In the very controversial Article 159, on the composition, proce-
dure, and voting of the Council, the changes are minimal. As in the
ET,130 half of the thirty-six members of the Council are elected on the
basis of special interests and half according to regional representa-
tion.
In the ET the first group of Council members (four) in subpara-
graph (a), which is to be elected from technologically advanced
States, must include at least one representative from the Eastern
(Socialist) European region. No such provision was made for the
second group (f6ur) in subparagraph (b), which is to be elected
from major importers of the kinds of minerals to be derived from the
125. ET, pt. II, supra note 61.
126. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 157(7).
127. RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, art. 25(7).
128. ET, pt. II, supra note 61, art. 25(10).
129. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 157(10).
130. ET, pt. II, supra note 61, art. 27.
Area. The ICNT adds the provision, however, that this group too
must include at least one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European
region. 3' There appears to be no reason why this should upset the
balance of the mining consortia or the minds of its members.
The next group (four) in subparagraph (c) is to be elected from
among States which, on the basis of production in areas under their
jurisdiction, are major exporters of nodule minerals. The ICNT adds
that this group must include at least two developing States. 132 This
addition, however, should not be understood to increase the repre-
sentation of developing countries on the Council because mineral
exporting developing countries are not included in the next category
(six) in subparagraph (d) concerning developing countries. Further-
more, subparagraph (e) has been adjusted so that the members to be
elected from developing countries under this subparagraph may
number two less. The purpose of this subparagraph is to balance the
whole system of elections to the Council to insure "equitable geo-
graphical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole."'
'
One substantial change was made in paragraph 7, Article 159, con-
cerning the voting procedure. On this subject the ET provision had a
paralyzing effect: "All decisions on questions of substance shall be
taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting,
provided that such majority includes a simple majority in four of the
five categories specified in paragraph 1. ' '134 The ICNT raises the
required majority from two-thirds to three-fourths of the members
present and voting but eliminates the crippling requirement of a
majority in four of the five groups. This proviso is replaced by a far
simpler one: "provided that such majority includes a majority of the
members participating in that session."
135
There have been minor changes in Article 160(2) of the ICNT.
Subparagraph (ii) reads "a list of candidates" where the ET read only
"candidates.' '13 6 Enumerating the powers and functions of the
Council, the ET read: "[a]dopt necessary and appropriate measures
: * * to protect against adverse economic effects."'31 7 The ICNT reads
in subparagraph (xii): "[a]dopt on the recommendation of the
Economic Planning Commission necessary and appropriate meas-
ures.,,138
131. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 159(1)(b).
132. Id., art. 159(1)(c).
133. Id., art. 159(1)(e).
134. ET, pt. II, supra note 61, art. 27(6).
135. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 159(7).
136. ET, pt. II, supra note 61, art. 28(2)(i).
137. Id., art. 28(2)(xi).
138. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 160(2)(xii).
394
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Among the functions of the Rules and Regulations Commission, the
ET had a provision 2(iv): "[a]dvise the Technical Commission on all
legal aspects of its work.' 13 9 This has been omitted in the ICNT,
Article 164.
In conformity with other parts of the Convention, "this Part of the
Convention" in the ET becomes, throughout, "this Part of the present
Convention" in the ICNT. Additionally, the ICNT substitutes "the
present Convention" where the ET uses "this Convention."
There are no other changes in this crucially important section on
the structure and functions of the Authority. The composition of the
Council, nevertheless, is not yet satisfactory. It is unduly
complicated, which reflects the lack of clarity with regard to the
scope, purpose and functions of the Authority mentioned above. If
the Authority is a business, its controlling organ should be structured
like that of a business enterprise; that is, it should represent finan-
cial power and financial interests. If it is a forum to negotiate
commodity agreements, it must be a forum for the meeting of produc-
ers and consumers of the commodity. If it is a Seabed Authority, an
Authority with broad political responsibilities for the rational man-
agement of a large area of ocean space which is the common heritage
of mankind, then it is the whole international community that must
be represented in the controlling organs. And the principles of repre-
sentation or participation must be as comprehensive, nondis-
criminatory, and simple as possible.
The Seabed Authority is both an intergovernmental organization
and a business. It is a political, economic, scientific institution. It is a
prototype which will influence the evolution of all international
organization. Increasingly, international and national institutions
alike will be compelled to achieve this new synthesis which responds
to the need for interdisciplinary decisionmaking in contemporary
society.
The solution suggested by the ICNT (which is exactly the same as
that suggested in the ET) is not successful. The powers and functions
of the Council enumerated in Article 160 do not correspond to the
functions of the Authority described in Article 151. The function of
the Council described in Article 160 is essentially to administer the
nodule mining business. While the pertinent provisions are de-
139. ET, pt. II, supra note 61, art. 32(2)(iv).
lineated in great detail, there is no reference to scientific research,
conservation of the environment, or other matters included under the
heading "Conduct of activities in the Area" and "Functions of the
Authority."
Scientific research, environmental policy, and the transfer of tech-
nology are entrusted to the Technical Commission, an organ of the
Council. In the RSNT, the Enterprise was also empowered to carry
out and to promote scientific research, 140 but this has been cancelled
in the ICNT. Nothing is said about how to coordinate scientific
research between the Enterprise and the Technical Commission or
the nature of the Council's function.
Of course it may be assumed scientific research is included in the
implied powers and functions of the Council because it has the power
"to establish. . . the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority
on any questions or matters within the competence of the Authori-
ty.,141 It is surprising, nevertheless, that scientific research is not
mentioned among the functions of the Council, which are described
as those of a business administration. However, this strengthens the
arguments favoring interest representation, weighted voting, and
independence from the Assembly. If, instead, Article 160 delineated
the entire range of responsibilities which the Council bears for the
Authority, demand for a more participational system would be jus-
tified based on simple principles of State equality, geographical
distribution (regional representation) and rotation of seats within
each region, so that every State gets its turn on the Council. Thus, the
political and economic aspects of the Authority would be combined
and separated more efficiently. The Council would be a political
body; the Enterprise (Enterprise system) would be an economic body,
a business wherein financial interests would be duly represented.
The ICNT provides an example of a highly responsible body
composed, more or less, according to these principles: The Law of the
Sea Tribunal. 142 Article 3 of the Tribunal's statute provides that "[n]o
two members of the Tribunal may be nationals of the same State,'
1 43
and "[t]here shall be not less than three members from each geo-
graphical group as established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations."'1 44 This very simple system could easily be adapted
to the Council. The Law of the Sea Tribunal has twenty-one mem-
bers,14 the Council has thirty-six.146 Accordingly, it might be pro-
140. RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, Annex II, para. 7(a).
141. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 160(1).
142. See id., Annex V.
143. Id., Annex V, art. 3(1).
144. Id., Annex V, art. 3(2).
145. Id., Annex V, art. 2(1).
146. Id., art. 159(1).
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vided that "there shall not be less than five members from each
geographical group" in the Council.
With regard to the three Commissions to be established by the
Council,147 there has been some tidying up to streamline their opera-
tions and to avoid overlapping responsibilities. The functions of the
Technical Commission, however, still appear to be too heteroge-
neous, ranging from scientific research to the inspection and auditing
of all books, records and accounts related to the financial obligations
of the Authority, and including the supervision of all operations
concerning activities in the Area.148 Perhaps it would contribute to
orderliness and comprehensiveness to maintain the Economic Plan-
ning Commission as it is, but to rename the other two Commissions
the "Commission for Science and Technology" and the "Legal
Commission." The responsibilities of the latter would include all
activities related to rules and regulations.
In section 5 of Part XI of the ICNT, "The Authority," there are no
substantial changes in subsections 4 through 7, concerning the Sec-
retariat, the Enterprise, finance, and legal status, privileges and
immunities.1 49 The "Legal Status, privileges and immunities" sec-
tion 0 has generated an interesting discussion (repeated and inten-
sified in connection with the legal status, privileges and immunities
of the Enterprise), arising, once more, from the ambiguity of the
nature of the Seabed Authority: Is it a political institution, or is it a
business? Those who consider it to be a comprehensive political
institution intended to manage the common heritage of mankind
would like to see privileges and immunities maximized. Those who
see it as a business, competing with other private and profit-making
businesses in the production of nodule minerals, would like to see
privileges and immunities so minimized as to keep the whole system
competitive. That the Authority and its Enterprise, which should
represent all mankind, can be considered as a competitor of private
147. The Council is to establish an Economic Planning Commission, id., art.
161(a), a Technical Commission, and a Rules and Regulations Commission, id.,
art. 161(b). These Commissions are described in Article 162 (The Economic Plan-
ning Commission), Article 163 (The Technical Commission), and Article 164
(The Rules and Regulations Commission).
148. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 163(2).
149. Part XI, § 5(4)-(7) corresponds to Part I, Articles 41-60 of the RSNT.
RSNT, supra note 3, pt. I, arts. 41-60.
150. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI, § 7.
and State companies is one of the consequences-and basic weak-
nesses-of the parallel system.
Settlement of Disputes
Section 6 of Part XI, "Settlement of Disputes," has been vastly
improved after the unanimous decision of the Conference to abolish
the dual system established by the RSNT. That system provided for a
Law of the Sea Tribunal 5' and a separate Seabed Tribunal, 15 2 with
very little coordination between the two. The ICNT abolishes the
Seabed Tribunal and provides more functionally for a Law of the Sea
Tribunal,153 with a special Chamber for cases arising from Part XI of
the Convention.
54
This simplifies the dispute settlement section of Part XI con-
siderably. The provisions of the third "Evensen package" concerning
dispute settlement 55 have been adopted by the ICNT without any
substantial changes and only two very minor rhethorical changes.
Article 190 of the ICNT, "Advisory opinions," which provides that
the Seabed Disputes Chamber "shall give advisory opinions when
requested to do so by the Assembly, the Council or any of its organs,
on any legal question arising within the scope of their activities,"
156
adds only one sentence to the ET: "Such advisory opinions shall be
rendered as a matter of urgency."'51 7 The addition is useful because
paragraph 10 of Article 157 provides that, on the request of one
quarter of the members of the Authority, an advisory opinion must be
sought on any matter concerning the conformity with the Convention
of a proposed action before the Assembly, and voting on such a
matter is stayed pending the delivery of the Chamber's advisory
opinion.
58
The second addition appears in Article 191, entitled "Scope of
jurisdiction with regard to decisions adopted by the Assembly or
Council." The added line which is tacked onto the end of the article
reads: "in no case shall it [the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber] substitute
its discretion for that of the Authority."' 5 9 The addition is
151. RSNT, Supra note 3, pt. IV.
152. Id., pt. I.
153. See ICNT, supra note 2, Annex V.
154. Id., pt. XI, § 6.
155. Norway: Settlement of Disputes (July 9, 1977), reprinted in 2
FORSCHUNGSINSTITUT FUR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND SICHERHEIT, STIFTUNG
WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK, DOKUMENTE DER DRITTEN SEERECHTSKONFERENZ
DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN-NEW YORKER SESSION 1977, at 473 (1977).
156. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 190.
157. Id.
158. Id., art. 157(10).
159. Id., art. 191.
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rhetorical rather than substantive because it merely summarizes the
preceding paragraph. The addition is intended to assuage any fears
that the Chamber, rather than the Assembly, might become the su-
preme organ of the Authority in what many have termed a system of
"gouvernement des juges."
The section on dispute settlement must fulfill three basic require-
ments: First, it must identify the issues that are subject to juris-
diction; second, it must ensure that all parties involved (not only
States, but companies, juridical persons, international organizations,
and so forth) have access to the dispute settlement system; and third,
it must set forth the basic obligation to seek peaceful settlement of
disputes according to the procedures established for resolving the
issues subject to jurisdiction. This notion, as was pointed out during
the debate, does not include commercial arbitration, which can be
dealt with in the usual ways. But it might encompass issues concern-
ing the repudiation of contract, the legality of decisions by various
organs of the Authority, or potential disputes between States about
the interpretation and application of the Convention. Considering
the peculiarity of the new law, the emergence of new concepts of
equity, the difficulties of resource management, and the novelty of
the basic concept of the common heritage of mankind, inter-State
disputes might be numerous and substantial. Section 6 achieves these
basic purposes.
Article 191, as already mentioned, was the result of lengthy discus-
sion about the interrelationship and the relative strength of the
Assembly and the Council on the one hand, and the Dispute Settle-
ment Chamber on the other.
Article 192 attempts to achieve a compromise on a new, politically
sensitive issue: the relations between States and nongovernmental
entities in proceedings before the tribunals. States more conservative
in matters relating to international law insisted that private
companies or persons could not have standing before the tribunal
and that the State "sponsoring their activities" must act on their
behalf. Other delegations, however, would give nongovernmental
entities full access to the tribunals, and they have pointed out that
this would be in the best interest of States because obligatory inter-
vention could magnify and politicize issues which might otherwise be
resolved without such intervention. Article 192 provides a compro-
mise by establishing that "[w]hen in a dispute.. . , a national of a
State Party is a party, the sponsoring State shall be given notice
thereof, and shall have a right to intervene in the proceedings."'160 In
conjunction with Part XI one should consider Part XV, Articles 287
(2), 288 (3) and 291 (2), all of Annexes II and I, and Articles 15, 22,
and 37 through 41 of Annex V.
The articles referred to from Part XV describe in general terms the
dispute settlement system, including its binding character, as it is
applicable to the seabed, and also the establishment of a Seabed
Chamber and its accessibility to entities other than States.
Annex II, setting forth the basic conditions for exploration and
exploitation of the Area in elaborate, and therefore rapidly obsoles-
cent terms, could be drastically reduced or dispensed with altogether
if the analysis of this article were correct and the "parallel system"
were to be replaced by a unitary joint-venture system. If this oc-
curred, Annex I, which is the "Statute of the Enterprise," would
have to be modified,161 especially with regard to the articles on
composition of the "Governing Board"'162 and "finance."' 1 3 Most of
the other articles could remain basically unchanged.
The articles of Annex V constitute a significant breakthrough for
the ICNT. Decisive progress has been made in creating a comprehen-
sive dispute settlement system, harmonizing the different parts of the
Convention. The dispute settlement system is in fact a prototype of
the kind of integrative machinery that is required by the interaction
of uses of ocean space and resources and which, eventually, will have
to be carried over from the juridical to the political and administra-
tive levels.
Of particular interest in this context is the method of election of
the judges of the Seabed Chamber. All judges of the Law of the Sea
Tribunal are nominated by States and elected at a meeting of States
Parties convened periodically for this purpose. From the total of
judges thus elected, the Assembly of the Seabed Authority selects
those who are to constitute the Seabed Chamber.164 It is a most
ingenious way of linking this prototype of integrative machinery
with one of the basic marine activities organizations. This approach
might have a germinal influence on other parts of the system at a
later stage.
160. Id., art. 192.
161. E. BORGESE, THE ENTERPRISES (1977) (Occasional Paper No. 6, Interna-
tional Ocean Institute).
162. ICNT, supra note 2, Annex III, para. 5.
163. Id., para. 10.
164. Id., Annex V, arts. 4, 37.
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CONCLUSION
The development of the Law of the Sea will continue in the
context of the emergence of a new international order, including a
new international economic order during a third and a fourth Devel-
opment Decade. The ICNT is a unique document the likes of which
the international community has never dealt with before. Whatever
its weaknesses and imperfections-and it is unfinished business-it
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